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A franchise contract relocates distributable rent between franchisor and franchisee. 
With  decentralized wage bargaining this modifies the position of the union in wage 
bargaining. If the rent is relocated to the franchisor completely, then even a strong union 
is not able to raise the wage above reservation level in the franchisee's firm. If franchisor 
and franchisee negotiate on rent division, there is an incentive to increase franchise fee 
with the consequence that franchisee's wage is pushed down. Therefore the overall rent 
assigned to labor depends on the differences of labor intensity in the franchisor's and 
franchisee's firm. Firm owners may be able to transfer distributable rents from a firm 
with a strong union to one with a weak union. Additional a franchising contract shows up 
a first mover advantage. The franchising contract is placed before wage bargaining, 
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A Note on Franchising and Wage Bargaining
In economic analysis a horizontal perspective dominates. Competition is the magic
word central in many scienti¯c papers. Beside this horizontal aspect economic activity
has also a vertical perspective. Upstream and downstream production stages in°uence
the economic outcome and therefore wage ¯nding processes in di®erent ways. Between
horizontally competing ¯rms labor plays a substitutional role, from consumers' point of
view labor of one ¯rm can be substituted by labor from a competing ¯rm, while between
vertically connected ¯rms labor plays a complementary role. Horn and Wolinsky (1988)
have shown that the substitutability has an important in°uence on the organization of
labor unions and therefore on the bargaining process. Grandner (2001b) has studied the
e®ects of wage bargaining institutions in vertically connected oligopolies and Grandner
(2001a) has analyzed the e®ects of wage bargaining on ¯rm's incentive to integrate verti-
cally.
A franchising contract is a special, well analyzed, vertical relationship, but its e®ects
on wage bargaining have not been examined so far.
The most prominent reason for franchising contracts as analyzed in the literature is
incomplete or asymmetric information (see for example Tirole (1988)). But following the
argument of double marginalization (Spengler 1950) rent creation and rent extracting also
play a role in motivating franchising contracts. The following note concentrates on these
arguments and on the e®ects of rent extracting by a franchising contract on the wage
bargaining process between a franchisee and a trade union.
The argument is simple. With a franchising contract (a two part tari®) the distributa-
ble rent is relocated between franchisor and franchisee. With decentralized wage bargai-
ning, each ¯rm faces a single union, the bargaining position of the union is modi¯ed by
this relocation. If rent is relocated to the franchisor completely, even a strong union is
not able to raise wage above the reservation wage in the franchisee's ¯rm, because there
is no rent left. If we apply this argument to a situation where franchisor and franchisee
negotiate on the franchising contract and therefore on rent division, we ¯nd that wage
bargaining in the franchisee's ¯rm pushes up the franchise fee and as a result wages has
to be lower in the franchisee's ¯rm. As a consequence the overall rent assigned to labor
depends on labor intensity di®erences in the franchisor's and franchisee's ¯rm. If for exam-
ple the franchisor does not produce at all but is a pure licensor, the rent share obtained
by labor (in both ¯rms) will be smaller than without franchising. A further example,
where this argument may become important, is that ¯rm owners may have an incentive
to transfer distributable rents from countries (or regions) with strong unions to countries
with weak unions. To avoid this incentive unions (or countries) would prefer centralized
wage bargaining. An additional aspect of franchising is that there exists a ¯rst mover
advantage. The franchising contract is negotiated before the wage bargaining takes place.
This gives the franchisor an advantage to extract additional rent by increasing the fee,
pushing down the wage rate in the franchisee's ¯rm.
The presented model has a simple two-period time structure. In the ¯rst period fran-
chise fee and transfer price are ¯xed by a rent division rule, described by Nash bargaining.
In the second period the wage rate in the franchisee's ¯rm (downstream ¯rm) is determi-
ned in an e±cient bargaining. (Consumer price and wage rate are chosen simultaneously.)
The focus is on rent division and I assume therefore that franchisee and franchisor are
(local) monopolists.
1For simplicity let us assume a linear consumer demand.




with q is the quantity demanded, p the consumer price and k a constant. For economic
reasons, let p < k.
Output is normalized in a way that one unit of output is produced by one unit of
labor. The only costs for the franchisee are labor costs and payments to the franchisor,
consisting of transfer price (pu) times quantity and franchise fee (f). The franchisee's
pro¯t is given by
¼d = (p ¡ pu ¡ w)q ¡ f (2)
Because the model has a recursive structure we have to start with analyzing period 2.
Period 2
In the second period franchise fee and transfer price are given for the wage bargaining
partners. The franchisee and the union bargain over the wage rate and employment, given
the speci¯ed franchising contract.
McDonald and Solow (1981) have shown, that e±cient bargaining results in an employ-
ment decision o® the labor demand curve. (For a discussion on di®erent wage bargaining
models, see Naylor (2003)). In the e±cient bargaining framework the bargaining agendas
are the wage rate and the employment level. With the present formalization the resulting
contract curve is vertical, that means that employment is independent of the bargaining
power of the union and the realized wage rate. (See Farber (1986) for possible shapes of
contract curves.)
One of the franchisee's decision variables is the price. Together with the union he/she
is ¯xing consumer price and wage rate in a bargaining. Consumer demand is given and
by ¯xing the price, output and therefore employment also are determined.
The union tries to maximize the following objective function1.
U = (w ¡ w)q (3)
with w is the actual wage rate and w is the reservation wage.
The franchisee tries to maximize pro¯t (2) and its disagreement utility is zero.
The bargaining will be described by a (generalized) Nash bargaining. (See Nash (1950)




with 0 · ® · 1 is the relative bargaining power of the union.
The bargaining partners are ¯xing price and wage rate in an optimal way. The two
¯rst order conditions give
p =
k + pu + w
2
) q =
k ¡ pu ¡ w
2k
(5)
w ¡ w =




k ¡ pu ¡ w
(6)
1 Labor force is normalized to one and disagreement utility of the representative union member is
the reservation wage (w). The union tries to maximize the di®erence between the expected utility of the
representative member and his/her disagreement utility.
2² Consumer price and therefore quantity depend on the reservation wage, not on the
actual wage rate. This is caused by the e±cient bargaining framework combined
with the speci¯c objective functions.
² The wage rate depends negatively on the franchise fee. By increasing the franchise
fee ¯rm owners can reduce the wage rate.
² If the union has no bargaining power at all (® = 0), the wage rate is equal to the
reservation wage.
Period 1
In time period 1 franchisor and franchisee bargain over the franchise contract, that is
franchise fee and transfer price. Franchisor's pro¯t is simply given by
¼u = (pu ¡ c)q + f (7)
where c are the unit costs, including labor costs, if there is production by the franchisor.
We do not analyze wage bargaining by the franchisor, which would be very easy to add
in.
The rent division between franchisor and franchisee is characterized by maximizing




with 0 · ¯ · 1 is the relative bargaining power of the franchisee in the franchising
contract bargaining.
Given the time structure of the model the franchise partners select an optimal fee and
transfer price based on the calculated result of the wage bargaining (5) and (6).
Solving both ¯rst order conditions we get
p
¤
u = c (9)
Equilibrium price and quantity are therefore
p
¤ =









¤ = (1 ¡ ¯)kq
¤2 (11)
Equilibrium wage rate can be displayed as
w
¤ ¡ w = ®¯kq
¤ (12)
² Equation (9) is the standard result for franchising contracts between vertically
connected monopolies. Rent is maximized by setting the transfer price equal to
marginal costs.
² p and q depend on the reservation wage, not on the actual wage rate. Because p
would increase and q would decrease with w, we get the lowest possible price and
the highest possible quantity. Again rent is maximized.
3² Compared to an exogenously ¯xed wage rate, q is higher with bargaining as long as
the exogenously given wage is higher than reservation wage.2
² The franchise fee is higher with bargaining, compared to a situation with an exo-
genously given wage which is higher than the reservation wage. This characteristic
lowers the actual wage rate.
² Franchisee's pro¯t depends on the distribution of the bargaining power in the fran-
chising contract negotiation and in the wage bargaining. But unions bargaining
power does not in°uence franchisor's pro¯t. (Equations are given in the appendix).
Simultaneous Setting
To ¯gure out more precisely the e®ects of the timing of franchising on the wage bar-
gaining process, assume that the negotiation on the franchising contract and the wage
bargaining in the franchisee's ¯rm take place simultaneously. The two separated proces-









U, ¼d, ¼u, ®, and ¯ are de¯ned as before.
The analysis of the wage bargaining is the same as in the sequential setting, so ¯rst
order conditions are the same (see equations (5) and (6)).
The analysis of the optimal franchise fee and the transfer price changes, because in the
simultaneous setting franchisor and franchisee cannot anticipate the same reaction of wage
bargaining partners as in the sequential one. With sequence franchisor and franchisee know
that the union will react. With simultaneous bargainings a direct reaction is not possible.
Furthermore with ¯xed quantity (by means of a ¯xed consumer price) the franchisor and
franchisee have the freedom to transfer the rent by way of fee or by way of transfer price.
The optimal values of variables pu and f are related, but we can ¯x one arbitrarily. Let
us set pu = ~ pu = c as in the above analysis.
Combining all remaining ¯rst order conditions we get the simultaneous equilibrium.
(First order conditions are given in the appendix.)
~ p = p
¤ =
k + c + w
2
and ~ q = q
¤ =
k ¡ c ¡ w
2k
(14)
² The equilibrium values for p are the same in the sequential and in the simultaneous
setting. p and therefore q do not depend on bargaining power. Again this result
stems from the vertical contract curve in the present case.
2 No Wage Bargaining: ^ w > w is ¯xed exogenously, for example in a nation wide bargaining.
@¼d
@p
= 0 ) ^ p =
k + pu + ^ w
2
) ^ q =
k ¡ pu ¡ ^ w
2k
If pu = c and ^ w > w ) ^ p > p¤ and ^ q < q¤
As a result, ^ f is lower than f¤ too.
3 One can merge the two separated bargainings into one single bargain described by the solution of
the Nash product Ns = U®1¼d
®2¼u






1¡®1¡®2. This merged model has the same results as the present model with two separated
bargainings.
4~ f =
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¯)(k ¡ c ¡ w)2
4k(1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯))
=
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¯)kq¤2
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
(15)
and
~ w ¡ w =
®¯(k ¡ c ¡ w)
2(1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯))
=
®¯kq¤
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
(16)
Now we can compare wage and franchise fee determination in the sequential and
simultaneous setting.
² In the simultaneous setting the franchise fee is lower (or equal) than in the sequential
setting.
² In the simultaneous setting the franchisee's wage rate is higher (or equal) than in
the sequential setting.
They are equal only if (a) the union has no bargaining power at all (® = 0). Then the
wage rate is equal to the reservation wage, or (b) the franchisee has no bargaining power
in the franchising contract negotiation (¯ = 0). Then no rent is left for sharing in the
wage bargaining and the wage rate is equal to reservation wage, or (c) the franchisor has
no bargaining power at all (¯ = 1). Then the whole rent is divided between the franchisee
and the union in both settings and the franchise fee is zero. (The algebraic expressions
can be found in the appendix.)
Thus the introduction of a sequence implicates a redistribution between pro¯t earner
and labor in favor of pro¯t earner. Additionally, there is a redistribution between franchisor
and franchisee in favor of franchisor. Similar to a Stackelberg duopoly game there is a
¯rst mover advantage. The franchisor can attract additional rent by forcing the wage rate
in the franchisee's ¯rm down.
Finally, we can analyze the e®ect of an increasing union bargaining power on the ¯rst
mover advantage. Given the bargaining power of the franchisee in the negotiation on the
franchising contract (with ¯ 6= 0 and ¯ 6= 1), the di®erence in the wage rate given in the
sequential and the simultaneous setting is increasing with the bargaining power of the
union. (@( ~ w ¡ w¤)=@® ¸ 0, see appendix). A more powerful union is able to achieve a
higher rent share but is also more vulnerable by the sequence in the model.
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6Appendix
Sequential Setting: Period 2
The ¯rst order condition for the consumer price is given by
@Nd
@p






The ¯rst order condition for the wage is given by
@Nd
@w






Combining (17) and (18) generates (5) and (6) in the text.
Sequential Setting: Period 1
From the ¯rst order condition for the transfer price we get
@Nu
@pu
= 0 ) f =
kq2((1 ¡ ¯)k + (1 + ¯)c ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)w ¡ 2pu)
k + (1 ¡ ¯)c ¡ w ¡ (2 ¡ ¯)pu
(19)
The ¯rst order condition for the franchise fee is given by
@Nu
@f




(1 ¡ ¯)k ¡ (1 + ¯)pu ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)w + 2¯c
¶
(20)
Combining (19) and (20) results in (9) and (11) in the text.
Pro¯ts in the sequential setting are given by
¼
¤
d = (1 ¡ ®)¯kq
¤2 and ¼
¤






u = (1 ¡ ®¯)kq
¤2 (22)
Simultaneous Setting







Let pu = c, then the ¯rst order condition for f is given by
@Nu
@f







Combining pu = c, (5), (6) and (24), we get the solution mentioned in the text.
Pro¯ts in the simultaneous setting are given by
~ ¼d =
(1 ¡ ®)¯kq¤2
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
and ~ ¼u =
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¯)kq¤2
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
(25)
~ ¼d + ~ ¼u =
(1 ¡ ®)kq¤2
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
(26)
7E®ects of the sequence:
~ w ¡ w
¤ =
(1 ¡ ¯)¯®2q¤
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
¸ 0 (27)
~ f ¡ f
¤ = ¡
(1 ¡ ¯)®¯kq¤2
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
· 0 (28)
~ ¼d ¡ ¼d
¤ =
(1 ¡ ®)®(1 ¡ ¯)¯kq¤2
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
¸ 0 and ~ ¼u ¡ ¼u
¤ = ¡
(1 ¡ ¯)®¯kq¤2
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
· 0 (29)




1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯)
· 0 (30)
@(~ w ¡ w¤)
@®
=
(1 ¡ ¯)(2 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯))®¯q¤
(1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¯))2 ¸ 0 (31)
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